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Judged by the principle of intertemporal Pareto optimality, insecure property rights and the greenhouse
effect both imply overly rapid extraction of fossil carbon resources. A gradual expansion of demand-reducing
public policies -- such as increasing ad-valorem taxes on carbon consumption or increasing subsidies
for replacement technologies -- may exacerbate the problem as it gives resource owners the incentive
to avoid future price reductions by anticipating their sales. Useful policies instead involve sequestration,
afforestation, stabilization of property rights and emissions trading. Among the public finance measures,
constant unit carbon taxes and source taxes on capital income for resource owners stand out.
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1. The greatest externality ever 
 
There are only small amounts of carbon dioxide,  2 CO , in the atmosphere, just about 0.04%. 
But this small amount is just right for us. Less would make the world too cool, and more 
would make it unpleasantly hot. Mankind has genetically been optimized and adapted to a 
situation that has prevailed with only little variation over millions of years. 
  The temperature of the Earth is the result of a delicate balance between the radiation 
received and remitted. In order for the Earth to maintain a given temperature, it needs to 
radiate as much energy back into space as it receives. The warmer the Earth is, the more 
energy it remits. If remittance is hampered by greenhouse gases, which absorb low-frequency 
emissions, but do not impede high frequency emissions, the Earth has to be warmer to 
nevertheless remit the energy it receives. Suppose the Earth’s atmosphere consisted only of 
oxygen and nitrogen, which in reality make up 99% of it. Then a square meter of the Earth’s 
surface would absorb, on average, 288 watts of energy, and the equilibrium temperature of the 
atmosphere that makes the Earth remit exactly these 288 watts would be −6oC. This would 
be way too cold for mankind to live there.
1 Fortunately, however, there are tiny quantities of 
greenhouse gases in the air, in particular 380 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide
2, up to 
0.02% of water vapor, and a few other, even rarer, though more effective, climate gases such 
as methane (1.8 ppm) or nitrous oxide (0.3 ppm). Taking other countervailing effects such as 
dust and clouds that cool the Earth into account, an equilibrium temperature of +15oC 
follows, which is today’s cozy average. The 21oC extra warmth relative to what would have 
prevailed without the greenhouse gases is just fine. Fortunately, the Earth does not have an 
atmosphere like Venus which consists predominantly of carbon dioxide. Venus has a 
temperature of 525oC. With that heat, there would be no life and no love on Earth.  
  Before the Industrial Revolution there were only 280 ppm carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere, and the average temperature was about 14oC. The nearly one-degree increase to 
15oC that we have seen in the meantime has not really been a problem. The 20 cm increase in 
the sea level that has resulted is tiny relative to the 5 m decline since the last warm period 
some 120,000 years ago, and even more so relative to the 100 m rise since the last ice age 
some 18,000 years ago.
3 But we are currently just at the beginning of a period of rapid 
change.  
                                                 
1 See Houghton (2004, p. 15 n.). 
2 See Stern et al. (2006, p. III).  
3 See Houghton (2004, pp. 145–150).   4
  Cautious “pre-Chinese” estimates predicted a doubling of the pre-industrial concentration 
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere until 2050, i.e. an increase to 560 ppm. They also 
predicted an increase to 650 ppm by 2100 if business goes on as usual.
4 The more recent 
estimates published in the Stern Review
5 are more pessimistic. They suggest that a doubling 
of the pre-industrial  2 CO  concentration could already take place up to 2035, and that by 
2100 a value of about 900 ppm would be reached in a business-as-usual scenario. The 
estimated temperature increase, as measured from the pre-industrial level, resulting from the 
doubling of the pre-industrial concentration level is about 2oC or more. A partial melting of 
glaciers and polar caps as well as the thermal expansion of the sea water would increase the 
sea level by about another 20 cm. The 5oC increase that the Stern Review fears up to 2100 
would increase the sea level by about one meter. If this does not sound much, note that a 5oC 
increase is about the increase in the world temperature since the last ice age and that a one 
meter rise in the sea level would flood more than one fifth of Bangladesh.
6 There are further 
dangers including more powerful and devastating tropical storms, the elimination of a 
substantial fraction of the world’s species, and droughts causing mass migrations toward more 
fertile countries and regions. Stern and his co-workers argue convincingly that temperature 
increases beyond 5oC would “take humans into unknown territory”.  
  Economists have challenged the Stern result that an increase by 5oC could cost mankind 
up to 7 trillion dollars in present value terms,
7 but whatever the true value is, the 
developments are alarming by all means. It is understandable that the Stern Review calls the 
carbon dioxide problem the “greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen”.  
 
2. Carbon, carbon dioxide and public policy 
Even before the Stern report fuelled a new public debate about the problem of global 
warming, most governments signing the Kyoto Protocol had taken action, subsidizing a wide 
variety of alternative technologies, including wind energy, water power stations, bio fuels, 
wood pellets, solar heating, photovoltaic panels and the like. High taxes on fuels have also 
given incentives to install better insulation of homes, mitigate the expansion of traffic and to 
build lighter cars empowered with hybrid engines or common-rail diesel engines. There is 
even a new interest in previously discarded nuclear technologies. The new EU system of 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Leggett, Pepper and Swart (1992). 
5 See Stern et al. (2006) 
6 See Muhtab (1998) and Houghton (2004, pp. 10 and 150-152 as well as figure 4.4. 
7 Nordhaus (2006), Tol and Yohe (2006), Byatt et al. (2006) and Carter et al. (2006).    5
2 CO  emissions trading has, moreover, induced business, in particular electricity producers 
and the chemical industry, to economize on their combustion processes.  
  All of this sounds encouraging in the efforts to overcome the world’s greatest market 
failure and solve its largest public goods problem. The idea is that if one country or a group of 
countries cut their  2 CO  emissions, aggregate emissions will be reduced by the same amount, 
and even if others do not follow, global warming will be mitigated at least somewhat. As 
described by the theory of privately provided public goods, the incentive to curtail emissions 
may not be enough from an efficiency perspective, but the situation is not hopeless. 
  Unfortunately, this view does not carry very far because it neglects the supply-side effects 
that result from the international and intertemporal linkages between the  2 CO  emitters via the 
underlying energy markets. All the technological devices cited above are means to reduce the 
demand for fossil fuels. But what about the supply of energy? The public debate is silent 
about the supply side of the problem, and even the voluminous Stern Review mentions the 
energy markets only in passing (pp. 185, 318). 
 How  the  2 CO  concentration in the atmosphere changes depends on extraction, and 
extraction is the result of both demand and supply. Extracting the carbon from underground 
and accumulating it in the air as carbon dioxide is one economic act that cannot simply be 
separated. Ultimately, all the demand reducing measures will mitigate the problem of global 
warming only to the extent that they induce the oil sheiks and other owners of fossil fuel 
resources to keep the carbon underground.  
  Suppose for a moment the oil sheiks cannot be convinced, i.e. suppose the suppliers of 
carbon stubbornly follow their intended extraction plans whatever happens to the price of 
carbon. In this case, the demand reductions by one country or a group of countries will be 
useless. They will simply reduce the world energy price and induce other countries to increase 
their energy demand by exactly the same amount. The amount of carbon dioxide accumulated 
in the air will not change, and global warming will continue unchanged.  
  But is the link between the extraction of carbon and the production of carbon dioxide 
emissions really that strong? Would it not be possible for policy-makers to induce the 
production of technical devices that decouple the emission of  2 CO  from the burning of 
carbon fuel by having more efficient combustion processes? Can’t we continue to produce 
energy from burning carbon without pumping more  2 CO  into the atmosphere? The answer is 
basically no, with only two exceptions, sequestration and afforestation, which will be 
discussed in section 6. The reason lies in the laws of chemistry. Fossil fuels basically consist   6
of molecules that are composed of carbon and hydrogen. Oxidation generates usable energy, 
converting the carbon into carbon dioxide and the hydrogen into water. Coal consists 
predominantly of carbon.
8 In crude oils, every 5 to 9 carbon atoms bind one hydrogen atom. 
Methane has 4 hydrogen atoms for each carbon atom. Each hydrogen atom brings an energy 
of about 30% of the energy contained in a carbon atom.
9 Thus, for example, a molecule of 
methane generates 2.2 times the energy of a molecule of carbon while generating the same 
amount of carbon dioxide.
10 While the ratio of energy relative to carbon dioxide is best for 
methane and a bit better for oil than for coal, none of the fossil fuels can avoid the production 
of carbon dioxide. In fact, with all fossil fuels the ratio between the carbon burned and the 
amount of carbon dioxide produced is the same chemical constant.  
  There is of course the possibility of increasing the efficiency of combustion processes by 
avoiding a waste of oxidizable carbon or a waste of heat generated by oxidation, but this does 
not contradict this statement. The laws of chemistry imply that demand reducing measures 
will be unable to mitigate the greenhouse effect unless they succeed in also reducing carbon 
supply. 
  It is obvious what kind of reactions the demand reducing policies described above will 
have if the supply path for carbon remains unchanged. Genuine demand reducing measures 
such as insulating homes, building lighter cars, or reducing traffic will simply mean that 
domestic demand is replaced by foreign demand, which is stimulated through a decline in 
world energy prices relative to what they otherwise would be. Alternative methods of 
generating usable energy from wind, water, sunlight or biomasses may also depress the price 
of energy in the world markets and stimulate demand elsewhere, but if, as assumed, they do 
not affect the extraction path, the general equilibrium reaction of world energy markets must 
be such that the alternative energy produced simply is consumed in addition to the energy 
contained in fossil fuels. There is a contribution to economic growth and mankind’s well 
being, but not towards a mitigation of the greenhouse effect. The same is true for measures 
that avoid the waste of heat or brake energy (hybrid cars). They generate more useful energy, 
but cannot reduce the consumption of carbon. Even the energy provided by nuclear power 
stations will come on top of the fossil energy rather than replacing it. And ironically, 
measures that improve the technical efficiency of combustion processes by avoiding the 
                                                 
8 Lignite coal consists to about 70% of carbon and about 5.5% of hydrogen, anthracite consists to about 93% of 
carbon, 3% of hydrogen. The rest is oxygen, nitrogen and sulphur. See Dubbel (1990). 
9 The figure cited refers to net calorific value, which is gross calorific value net of unavoidable loss of energy 
because of the vaporization of the water generated.  
10 One of the implications of this difference is that one tonne of methane generates 1.8 times the energy of one 
tonne of coal while generating even less carbon dioxide (2.75 versus 3.7 tonnes).   7
emission of unburned fossil fuel components through chimneys or exhaust pipes, such as the 
use of hotter combustion processes in power plants or the common rail diesel technology, 
would increase the world-wide output of  2 CO  and exacerbate the problem of global 
warming.  
  How much carbon will end up in the air if all fossil fuels are burned? Are the stocks in the 
ground so limited that we do not have to be afraid or are they so big that measures to limit 
resource extraction are appropriate? A little back-of-the envelope calculation clarifies the 
dimensions of the problem. From the Industrial Revolution until the year 2000, humans 
burned about 300 Gt of carbon from fossil fuels.
11 The total reserves of oil, coal and methane 
that under present conditions seem worth extracting have been estimated to be in the range 
between 766 and 983 Gt of carbon, say about 900 Gt to take a number close to the average.
12 
In the past, about 55% of the produced carbon dioxide was absorbed by land biomasses and 
the oceans (where 98% of carbon dioxide existing in the world is stored anyway).
13 Currently, 
(with the Stern figure of 380 ppm carbon dioxide) there are about 809 Gt of carbon in the 
atmosphere.
14 If the percentage of natural absorption is kept fixed, burning the reserves means 
that, roughly speaking, another 400 Gt of carbon will enter the atmosphere, which would be 
an increase by 49%, from 380 ppm to 566 ppm. According to the information given in the 
introduction, this would likely increase the world temperature by more than 2oC above the 
pre-industrial level.
15  
  However, resources might be a better base for the calculation than reserves. Resources 
include stocks underground that under current energy prices and with current technologies are 
not worth extracting, but that could become profitable with higher prices. Estimates of the 
overall stocks of resources for oil, gas and coal in terms of carbon content range from 3,967 to 
                                                 
11 Cf. World Energy Council (2000, p.149), between 1860 and 1998: 294 Gt of carbon. Marland et. al. (2005)  
between 1750 and 2004: 315 Gt. World Resource Institute (2005), between 1850 and 2000: 277 Gt of carbon.  
Note that the World Resource Institute reports CO2 emissions which have to be multiplied by 12/44 to get 
carbon emissions (see IPCC 1996, p 1.8).  
12 World Resource Institute (2005): 862 Gt; World Energy Council (2000, p. 149): 983 Gt; calculations on basis 
of BP (2007, S. 6,22,32): 766 Gt; Calculations on basis of  BGR (2007, S. 6 f..): 786 Gt. The carbon reserves 
consist to about 20–24 % of oil, 14-11 % of natural gas (methane) and 66–65 % of coal, calculated according to 
the proven reserves of BP (2007) and BGR (2007). Note that, for the reasons discussed above, the carbon shares 
cannot be equated with the energy shares. 
13 See Houghton (2004, p. 32). 
14The stock of CO2 in atmosphere is calculated using 5.137x10^18 kg as mass of the atmosphere, which 
translates to 1 ppm of CO2 = 2.13 Gt of carbon (Trenberth 1981). For the early 1990s the UN Environmental 
Program (1998) estimated about 750 Gt Carbon in the atmosphere, for the year 2000 the CDIAC (2000) 
estimated 369 ppm and about 787 Gt of carbon in the atmosphere.  
15 Assuming that the other greenhouse gases remain constant, this would raise the concentration of GHG in the 
atmosphere to about 616 ppm. For this level of greenhouse gas concentration, the Stern Review assigns a chance 
of between  82% and 100% that the global temperature will increase by at least 2°C. See Stern et al. (2006, p. 
195).   8
5,579 Gt.
16 If 45% of the lower of these two quantities enters the atmosphere, the stock of 
oxidized carbon existing there would increase from today’s 809 Gt to 2,594 Gt, i.e. by 221%. 
The concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would accordingly increase from 380 
ppm to about 1,220 ppm, far more than any model projections thus far have dared to predict. 
  The report of the Club of Rome (Meadows et al. 1972) and the oil crises of 1973/74 and 
1982 once nourished public fears about the limits to growth resulting from the foreseeable 
resource scarcity. Market enthusiasts had countered these fears on the grounds that reserves 
tend to increase with exploration activities and that the explorable stocks underground would 
be much larger than Meadows et al. assumed. Ironically, these same enthusiasts now have to 
admit that their optimism is giving rise the environmental pessimism that results from the 
above calculations. The perils of global warming could be large enough to make everyone 
think back wishfully to the low estimates about remaining resources given by Meadows et al.  
  The calculations show that with regard to the use of fossil carbon, humans face an 
extremely difficult choice problem that involves the simultaneous reduction of the stock 
underground and accumulation of the stock above ground. The carbon problem is serious 
enough that the limited absorption capacity of the air may constrain resource extraction more 
than the scarcity of the resources itself. The economics of resource extraction may have to 
convert into an economics of waste accumulation. 
  From an economic perspective there are fundamental normative and positive aspects that 
center around the question to what extent market failures distort the extraction paths relative 
to the optimum and which policy instruments could possibly remedy them.  The next two 
sections will go into this.  
 
3. The nature of the market failure 
If seen against the background of extracting fossil carbon from the ground, the market failure 
generated by  2 CO  emissions has little in common with the static marginal externality model 
used in textbooks, which is also the conceptual center of the Stern report (2006, esp. pp. 24–
28). To understand the market failure, an intertemporal analysis is needed that concentrates on 
the wealth society bequeaths to future generations. Society’s bequest includes natural capital 
in the ground, man-made capital above ground and the industrial waste resulting from past 
extractions in the air. There are two basic choice problems involved. One is the optimal mix 
between man-made capital, the natural resource and the stock of waste. The other is the 
                                                 
16 Cf. BGR (2005, p. 6 n.): 278 Gt of carbon from oil, 845 Gt of carbon from gas and 2,844 Gt of carbon from 
coal; World Energy Council (2000, p. 149): 426 Gt of carbon from oil, 534 Gt of carbon from gas and 4,618 Gt 
of carbon from coal.     9
overall wealth that society transfers to future generations. A crucial question is the extent to 
what market forces can be expected to find an appropriate solution to this double choice 
problem and, if markets fail, which kind of policy measures are appropriate to improve the 
intertemporal allocation of resources.  
 
3.1 Neoclassical optimism  
Let us approach this question stepwise and consider first the idealized neo-classical world of 
intertemporal resource allocation with exhaustible resources, abstracting from market failures 
in general and the problem of global warming in particular. Consider a representative resource 
owner who possesses a stock of the resource in situ, S,  with different degrees of accessibility 
so that extraction costs can be written as  () g SR ,  () 0 gS ′ < , where RS = − &  is the current flow 
of extraction and g is the extraction cost per unit. The resource owner chooses his extraction 
path so as to maximize the present value of his cash flow (( ) ) P gS R −  where  P is the price of 
carbon and i  the market rate of interest. If the resource owner extracts a unit today and invests 
the profit in the capital market he will earn a return of  ( ( )) iP g S − . If instead he postpones 
extraction, his return will be P & . Thus,  
 








               (positive)     
 
is a necessary condition for both an optimal extraction plan of the resource owner and a 
market equilibrium. In the special case where g = 0 this equation reduces to Hotelling’s 
condition that the percentage rate of price increase equals the rate of interest.
17  
  Because of the main theorem of welfare economics, the perfect market solution described 
by equation (1) must have its normative counterpart. Suppose output is given by the 
production function 
 
(2)                (,, ) Yf K R t =   
 
where K is the stock of man-made capital and t is calendar time. Output can be used for 
consumption of man-made goods C, investment of man-made goods K & , and resource 
                                                 
17 Note also that the rule does not say that the price net of the marginal extraction cost rises at a rate equal to the 
market rate of interest, which would be the case with marginal extraction costs depending on the current flow of 
extraction rather than the stock not yet extracted. See Sinn (1981) for further details.    10
extraction: 
 
(3)       ( ) YCKg S R =++ &  . 
 
Then, as shown in Sinn (1981), it is impossible to increase consumption in one period without 
decreasing it in another if, and only if,  
 











                (normative; Pareto). 
 
Equation (4) is a generalization of the efficiency condition of Solow (1974a) and Stiglitz 
(1974) for the extraction of depletable economic resources to the case of stock-dependent 
extraction costs. The Solow-Stiglitz condition refers to the special case where g = 0 and says 
that the extraction path be chosen such that the growth rate of the marginal product of the 
resource be equal to the marginal product of capital. With extraction costs this condition is 
modified such that the increase in the marginal product of the resource relative to the marginal 
product net of the extraction cost be equal to the marginal product of capital. As competitive 
markets imply that  K f i =  and  R f P = , equation (4) obviously coincides with equation (1), 
demonstrating the efficiency of the market equilibrium. 
  While equations (1) and (4) describe an optimal portfolio mix between man-made and 
natural capital to be bequeathed to future generations, they do not address the problem of how 
much wealth should and will be bequeathed. Answering this question is more problematic as 
it involves difficult intergenerational welfare judgments specifying the altruistic weight 
present generations are willing to give future generations. A common utilitarian specification 
uses an additively separable utility function of the type  
   () ()
0
() e d t NtUct t ρ
∞
− ∫  
where N is the number of people in a dynasty,  ( ) ct= ( ) Ct/ ( ) Nt is per capita consumption, U 
instantaneous utility and ρ  is the rate of utility discount across and within generations.  
  If individuals have the possibility of investing their wealth at the going market rate of 
interest, they allocate their consumption across the generations such that they equate their rate 
of time preference to the market rate of interest: 
   11
(5)       ˆ ic ρ η =+            (positive, utilitarian). 
 
Here the rate of time preference consists of the rate of utility discount ρ  and the relative 
decline in marginal utility resulting from an increase in per capita consumption over time,  
ˆ c η , where η  is the absolute value of the elasticity of marginal utility. 
  The normative counterpart of equation (5) is  
 
(6)       ˆ K f c ρ η =+                 (normative) 
 
because a benevolent central planner who respects individual preferences would allocate 
consumption over time such that people’s rate of time preference equals the return that a real 
investment is to be able to generate. Again, the market solution and the social planning 
solutions coincide.  
 
3.2 Nirvana ethics 
Many authors, notably Page (1977), Solow (1974 b), Anand and Sen (2000) as well as Stern 
et al. (2006, esp. annex to chapter 2) have argued that the market solution cannot be accepted 
on ethical grounds because discounting future utility means discriminating later generations 
relative to earlier ones. If anything, discounting could be justified by the probability of 
extinction for exogenous reasons, but the discount rate following from that argument is much 
smaller than the discount rates normally used, being in the order of one tenth of one percent.
18 
Without discounting of utility, only technical progress that increases per capita consumption 
would in the long run be able to explain a positive rate of time preference from an ethical 
perspective, but as that rate would be much lower, equation (6) would imply a lower marginal 
product of capital. This would mean more capital accumulation and, because of (4), more 
resource conservation: The marginal product of the resource would have to rise at a lower 
speed, which requires a flatter extraction profile with a lower extraction volume in the 
present.  
  The argument is as old as the theory of interest. Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk (1888), who 
introduced the distinction betweenρ and  ˆ c η  as the two main reasons for time preference, 
had already argued that people make a mistake when they underestimate future needs. 
Ramsey (1928, p. 543) and Pigou (1932, pp. 24–25) later repeated the argument.  
                                                 
18 Stern et al. (2006, p. 47). The probability implies that mankind becomes extinct with a probability of 9.5% in 
one hundred years.     12
  However, from the perspective of economic policy this argument leads nowhere, because it 
is not the philosophers who make collective policy decisions but the current generation of 
voters themselves. If the current generation discounts utility when they make their private 
intertemporal allocation decisions, they will elect politicians who do the same. These 
politicians will not find any mistakes in the intertemporal allocation pattern and will therefore 
not take countervailing policy actions.   
  Of course, one could counter from a philosophical perspective that it would nevertheless be 
wrong to follow the current generations’ preferences, because these preferences are wrong. 
However, that would be a dubious position, to say the least, because it would imply that 
parents do not take the needs of their children and further descendants into account and that a 
benevolent dictator, presumably advised by philosophers, is needed to enforce the lacking 
altruism. As I see no indication that parents might be insufficiently altruistic towards their 
offspring and neither envisage future generations coming from Mars and thus lacking a proper 
representation among the people living today, I find the argument totally unconvincing. If 
economics adopted it, it would leave the firm ground of methodological individualism and get 
stuck in the moody waters of Nirvana ethics.  
 
3.3 Insecure property rights 
An argument that is not based on mistrust in people’s preference is based on the fact that 
resource owners often face insecure property rights and might therefore overextract. It was 
developed by Long (1975) and extended by Konrad, Olson and Schöb (1994). Various papers 
by Chichilnisky (1994, 2004) also were written with a similar, yet more general message, 
although these papers were not focusing on the intertemporal dimension of the problem. 
  Think of an oil sheik. The sheik feels insecure as to how long his dynasty will possess the 
oil underground, because he fears the risk of revolt and subsequent expropriation by a rival. 
Let  
    ,. 0 , t e const π π − =>  
be the probability of survival of his or his heirs’ ownership until time t, where  π  is the 
instantaneous expropriation probability.  For a resource owner who maximizes the expected 
present value of his cash flow from resource extraction this effectively means that he 
discounts with i π +  rather than i alone. Hence (1) changes to
19 
                                                 
19 When the resource owner extracts the resource immediately and invests the cash flow in the capital market he 
has a return   (( ) ) iPgS − as before, but when he keeps the resource in the ground, the expected return now is 
(( ) ) PP g S π −− & . Equating these two expressions gives (7).    13
 








                        (positive, insecure property rights).  
 
As the probability of being expropriated denotes a private, but not a social damage, the 
welfare optimum continues to be given by (4) and (6). As  K if =  as before, equation (7) 
shows that for any given P the price path becomes steeper, which indicates overextraction and 
is a legitimization for conservative policy actions.  
  There is a similar implication for the extraction path if the property rights are improperly 
defined insofar as a multitude of firms extract from the same pool of oil or gas underground. 
The literature, including Khalatbari (1977), Kemp and Long (1980), McMillan and Sinn 
(1984) as well as Sinn (1982, 1984a), has demonstrated why the common pool problem 
implies overextraction and has discussed the possible policy remedies. The common pool 
problem was of major importance in the early years when the farmers of Texas detected they 
were sitting on a common pool of oil, and it therefore bears some responsibility for today’s 
2 CO problem. However, it seems that it has been largely solved by consolidating the oil fields 
or sharing arrangements between extracting firms.
20  
  Unfortunately, the problem of insecure property rights has not gone away over time, and 
indeed it could be substantial, in particular in the case of oil and gas extraction. Think of 
Venezuela, the Arab countries, Iran or the former Soviet Union, where the political situation 
has been extremely insecure over the last decades and is likely to remain so in the future. It is 
estimated that in these countries there are between 70% and 80% of the world’s oil and about 
three quarters of the world’s gas reserves.
21 Thus people like Hugo Chávez, Saddam Hussein, 
Muammar al-Gaddafi, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, Mikhail Khodorkovsky or Roman Abramovich 
are or were the custodians of substantial parts of mankind’s fossil fuel resources (and as it 
turns out now, also of the world’s atmosphere). If such people feel insecure about for how 
long they, their descendants or members of their clans will be able to extract the resources 
they currently own, they better hurry up, extract the resources now and safeguard the proceeds 
on Swiss bank accounts. 
  How exactly political risk affects resource extraction is still subject to debate. On the basis 
                                                 
20 The problem has regained its importance in the case of fossil water pools such as the Ogalalla aquifer beneath 
many Great Plain states in the US. 
21BP (2007) reports that in 2006 Venezuela, the former Soviet Union and the Middle East (i.e. Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and others) owned 79% of proven world oil 
reserves and 74% of proven gas reserves. For the same group of countries, EIA (2007) reports figures of 70% 
and 75%, respectively.   14
of a careful and extensive empirical study Bohn and Deacon (2000) showed that political risk 
may actually slow down extraction because it reduces the incentive to invest in exploration of 
new fields and in extraction technology. The authors construct a political risk index that 
explains ordinary investment well and then show that there is a negative correlation between 
this index and the speed of oil extraction. Interestingly enough, however, upon decomposition 
of the effects, Bohn and Deacon (pp. 476–477) also find that dictators tend to conserve the oil 
more than democracies do, while frequent coups or constitutional changes tend to speed up 
extraction. One interpretation of this result is that, while democracies offer more safety for 
outside investors and hence attract direct investment, they at the same time tend to challenge 
the property rights of the countries’ existing clans, who would not have carried out ordinary 
investment but own the countries’ natural resources. Democracy for these clans is a serious 
ownership risk, which gives them every reason to speed up extraction in a similar way as 
increasing political turmoil does. If this interpretation is correct, the result of Bohn and 
Deacon fully supports the view that increased ownership risk leads to overextraction. 
 
3.4 Global warming 
Let us now turn to global warming, the theme of this paper. What is the exact way in which 
this type of externality enters the positive and normative equations describing intertemporal 
allocation of resources? The answer to the first part of this question is obvious, as, by its very 
nature, the externality does not affect the conditions that characterize market behavior. 
Equations (2) or (6) respectively remain valid. The emissions of carbon dioxide are an 
externality par excellence as they distribute evenly around the globe, damaging air quality, the 
world’s most precious public good. 
  The real question is how the normative conditions are affected. Assume, in line with what 
was discussed above, that the temperature on Earth is a monotonically increasing function of 
the stock of carbon dioxide in the air, that the stock of carbon dioxide in the air is a 
monotonically increasing function of stock emitted, and that the stock emitted is proportional 
to the stock of carbon extracted. To the extent that the temperature deviates from the pre-
industrial level, it creates damages in terms of costs of dislocation, dyke building, air 
conditioning, reconstruction of buildings, agricultural damages and the like. As the damage or 
the necessary repair activities can be described as a loss of output, a reduced form of the 
aggregate production function with the damage from global warming is 
 
(8)       (,,, ) Yf K R S t = ,    15
 
where the resource in situ, S, stands in for the environmental quality in the sense of carbon 
being absent from the air. With  0, 0, SS S ff >< the normal properties of a production 
function can be assumed, which then also imply positive and increasing marginal damage 
from cumulative resource extraction. As shown in Sinn (2007) it follows from (8) and (3) that 
it is impossible to make one generation better off without making another one worse off, if 
and only if,  
 












          (normative, with greenhouse effect).  
 
Thus, (9) is a condition for intertemporal Pareto efficiency in the extraction of fossil fuels 
with stock-dependant damages from global warming, the analogue of equation (4) above.  
  Equation (9) shows that with global warming and hence  0 S f > ,  R f &  must be smaller for 
any given time and any given values of K, S and R. Thus it demands a flatter extraction path 
with less extraction in the present, but a lower decline thereafter. The larger the damage from 
global warming is, the wiser it is to shift extraction to the future.  
  If compared with the market equation (7) two aspects are worth noting. One the one hand, 
because of global warming,  0 S f > , the relative increase in the cash flow per unit extracted 
resulting from postponing extraction should be less than the rate of interest:   








        (normative). 
On the other, because of the risk of expropriation,  0 π > ,  the relative increase in the cash 
flow per unit extracted resulting from postponing extraction is even greater than the rate of 
interest: 








          (positive). 
The resource owners take a risk into account that they should not take into account, and they 
neglect a peril they should not neglect. For both reasons there is overextraction.  
  This result is in itself not surprising because it confirms the common belief that, because of 
global warming, the emissions of carbon dioxide should be reduced. Note, however, that it 
does not involve a value judgment that derives from considerations of inter-generation equity, 
fairness or sustainability, but follows merely from economic efficiency considerations.   16
Equation (9) describes an optimal composition in the wealth portfolio consisting of man-made 
capital, fossil fuels in situ and carbon waste in the atmosphere that society should bequeath to 
future generations whatever the size of the bequest is. Unfortunately, however, society does 




4. A simplified interpretation 
To summarize the discussion up to this point a graphical presentation that uses a somewhat 
simplified version of the neo-classical production function may be useful. Assume that 
(,,, ) () () FKRSt i K R S φ ψ =+ +  with  const. i = and otherwise the properties assumed above, 
i.e.  0, '' 0 φ φ ′ ><  and   0, '' 0 ψ ψ ′ >< .  Let  () ' () P RR φ =  denote the inverse demand 
function for carbon implied by this specification and assume that the price elasticity of 
demand,  ε − , is a constant.  
  Let us demonstrate the extraction path in R,S space, following a method developed in Sinn 
(1982). The slope of the possible time paths in R,S space is given by  
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as  ˆˆ ˆ d/ d / / (/) RSR S R R R P P == −= − & &&   and  ˆˆ / R P ε =  by definition. Rearranging (7) and 
using (10) gives  
 











             (positive). 
 
Equation (11) uniquely defines a slope for each point in R,S space and thus the set of possible 
paths compatible with the marginal conditions derived. Assume that  ( ) g S  and  '( ) S ψ  are 
differentiable and bounded from above so that they cannot go to infinity as S goes to zero 
while, by the assumption of a constant ε , the price is unbounded as R goes to zero. As is 
shown in the appendix this ensures that the extraction paths will lead to the origin. Thus, in 
fact, (11) uniquely defines the equilibrium path itself.  
  Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium paths for three alternative specifications. The middle path 
is an example of a path that characterizes a market equilibrium where  0 π = . As illustrated by   17
the arrows, the economy follows this path as time proceeds. On the way, the stock and the 
current extraction volume, S  and  R, both dwindle to zero. The upper, steeper path 
characterizes the market equilibrium with insecure property rights,  0 π > . It is obvious that it 
starts with higher extraction at  0 SS = ,  the given initial stock. Note that, although on this 
path, extraction is higher than with secure property rights for any given value of the stock in 
situ, this does not mean that extraction is higher for all points in time. In fact, as the stock 
shrinks faster, there must be a finite point in time after which extraction is permanently lower 
than it otherwise would have been. The extraction path in a diagram showing time at the 
abscissa and extraction on the ordinate would also be steeper than in the case with secure 


















Figure 1: Efficient and actual time paths in the presence of global warming and stock 
dependent extraction costs 
 
  The middle path showing the market equilibrium with well defined property rights would 
be Pareto efficient if there were no greenhouse effect. However with the greenhouse effect 
another path is Pareto efficient. Its slope follows from  (9) and (10) under the simplifying 








(π = 0)  18
 
(12)       
d( ) ' ( )
1
d( ) ( )
R gS S
i






              (normative, with greenhouse effect).  
 
Equation (12)  gives a lower slope for each point of the R,S diagram and hence a lower slope 
and position of the path leading to the origin, which, as is shown in the appendix,  remains the 
target point as time approaches infinity also from an efficiency perspective. A comparison of 
the three paths shown reiterates the point made above that the insecurity of property rights 
implies a higher current extraction volume than in standard analysis while the extraction 
volume should, in fact, be lower because of the greenhouse effect.  
 
   
5. Green policy paradoxes 
Let us now return to the problem of public policy. It was shown in section 2 that the demand 
policies emphasized in the public debate are useless if the supply path of carbon is fixed. 
Alternative ways of generating energy, carbon taxes or attempts to reduce the energy intensity 
of economic activities are all futile if the sheiks do not participate in the game. One country’s 
green policies just help the other country buy energy at lower prices, and the speed of global 
warming is unchanged.  
  While the assumption of exogenous supply was made for didactic reasons, it has more 
relevance for the resource problem than might appear at first glance for the simple reason that, 
apart from the extraction cost, fossil fuels need not be produced but are available at a given 
quantity in the Earth’s crust as a gift of nature. To be sure, this still leaves room for supply 
reactions in the sense of tilting the time path of extraction. However, if firms react to a change 
in demand today by extracting less, they must extract more tomorrow, and vice versa. In light 
of the marginal conditions discussed in the previous two sections the policies needed are those 
that make the extraction path flatter, which implies less extraction in the present and more in 
the distant future.   
  It may in addition be useful to choose policies that reduce the exhaustible stock of 
resources in the very long run. However, the analysis of the positive and normative conditions 
for such policies involves detailed assumptions on the limiting properties of the production 
and extraction cost functions which, in principle, cannot be observed empirically in this 
historical phase of time. Under the simplified assumption of the previous section, that the 
functions giving the unit extraction cost and the marginal product of the resource in situ are   19
differentiable and bounded from above as the stock in situ dwindles to zero while the resource 
price is unbounded, it would never be optimal to limit the exhaustible stock, but of course 
there are other possible assumptions, and nothing we know today would allow us to decide 
which ones are more realistic. Sound public policy against global warming should therefore 
focus on trying to flatten the time path of extraction rather than reducing the stock that will be 
exhausted as time goes to infinity. This is also advisable insofar as, for many years to come, 
the effects resulting from a policy of permanent exemption could easily be overcompensated 
by effects that operate via tilting the supply path.  
  If this postulate is accepted, most of the demand-reducing measures discussed in section 2 
may not pass the test. While some of them may reduce the stock worth extracting as time goes 
to infinity, it is by no means obvious that they will tilt the time path of extraction in the right 
direction. The reason is that they exert two countervailing effects on the current extraction 
volume. On the one hand, they reduce the incentive to extract because they depress today’s 
prices. On the other, they increase the incentive to extract because the anticipated demand and 
price decline that these policies generate in the future reduces the opportunity cost of the 
resource in situ. Unless it is demonstrated that the latter effect is dominated by the former, the 
policies cannot reasonably be proposed as a means to mitigate the greenhouse effect.  
  To be more concrete, let us begin the policy discussion with an analysis of tax systems.  
Consider first a cash flow tax to be paid by the resource owners. Such a tax will admittedly be 
hard to implement, but it is a good starting point for understanding the problem. The tax 
revenue equation for a cash flow tax is  
 
(13)       TZ τ = ,     ( ) () Z Pg SR ≡−          (cash flow tax) 
  
where T is the tax revenue, τ the tax rate and Z is the cash flow. Let  1 θ τ = − denote the tax 
factor. As is well known, a cash flow tax does not affect the extraction path, because choosing 
the extraction path so as to maximize the present value of  θ  times the cash flow stream is the 
same as choosing it so as to maximize θ  times the present value of this stream, and 
maximizing a constant times the economic result of an action is the same as maximizing the 
result itself. See Brown (1948) for the general argument and Dasgupta and Heal (1979, ch. 
12) as well as Sinn (1982, 1984 b) for its application to the taxation of exhaustible resource. A 
cash flow tax that is levied at a constant rate has the property of reducing the shadow price of 
the resource in situ exactly by the amount necessary to generate behavioral neutrality. It is the 
ideal example for a demonstration of the two countervailing effects.     20
  Consider next an ad-valorem sales tax on the extraction of carbon. This tax differs from a 
cash flow tax only insofar as extraction costs are not tax exempt. Let a star indicate the ad-
valorem tax. The tax drives a wedge between the consumer price P and the producer price, 
which is  *P θ . An ad-valorem sales tax might also be difficult to implement. However, a 
consumption tax levied by the consuming countries would be possible, and according to one 
of the main theorems of public finance, it would have the same allocative effects as the sales 
tax.  
  If there are no, or only negligible, extraction costs, the consumption tax is as neutral as a 
cash flow tax, because it then is such a tax. As the stock of the resource that will be extracted 
in the long run is given, there will be no supply reactions at any point in time. The only effect 
the tax has is that it makes the producers of carbon poorer by effectively expropriating part of 
the available stock in situ.  
  If extraction costs are not negligible, the consumption tax loses its neutrality property. As 
the resource firm tries to maximize the present value of the cash flow stream  *( ) RP g S R θ −  
which is equivalent to maximizing the present value of the stream  ( ( ) / *) RP g S R θ −  it is 
obvious that equation (7) changes to 
 











       (constant ad-valorem tax)  
 
which implies that, with any given values of i,  π  and P,  P & is becoming smaller. Thus the 
extraction path becomes flatter and indeed more carbon is conserved. The flattening of the 
path means less extraction in the present and more in the distant future.  
  This seems to shed a rather favorable light on the basic policy conclusion of the Stern 
Review, that a world-wide tax on the consumption of carbon would mitigate the global 
warming problem. There are two important caveats, however. One is that the tax only 
operates via increasing the marginal extraction costs. As marginal extraction costs are likely 
to be only a small fraction of the price of the extracted resource, the effect on the extraction 
path may be tiny. For instance, the average production costs of crude oil amounted to only 
about 15% of the average spot price in 2006.
22 The second is the assumed constancy of the tax 
rate. What if environmentalist concerns become more and more popular so that resource 
owners expect that governments will increase the tax rate over time?  
                                                 
22 Following Harks (2007) average production cost of crude oil amounted to about 10$ per barrel while the 
average spot price was about 65$ per barrel (see BP 2007).   21
  The answer has been given in Sinn (1982) with an intertemporal optimization model 
describing the market reactions to a changing ad-valorem tax rate.
23 Here it may be enough to 
sketch the argument. To understand the implications of a changing tax rate, let us for a 
moment return to the cash flow tax, which coincides with the ad-valorem tax if extraction 
costs are absent. Assume that the tax factor changes at a constant rate  ˆ θ :  
 
(15)      
ˆ ˆ ( ) (0) e , const. t t θ θθ θ ==  
 
As the resource owner maximizes the present value of his cash flow net of the tax relevant for 
the respective point in time, (15) together with the neutrality of a constant cash flow tax 
implies that he behaves as if he used a discount rate  ˆ i π θ + −  instead of only i π +  as was 
assumed before. Thus, instead of (14), we get 
 








         (changing cash flow tax). 
 
Equation (16) shows that with a changing tax rate, the often appraised neutrality of a cash 
flow or consumption tax disappears, giving way to substantial intertemporal distortions.
24 
With an increasing tax rate, i.e. with  ˆ 0 θ < ,  P & would have to be higher, with any given P 
indicating steeper rather than flatter price and extraction paths with more extraction in the 
presence. Thus the problem of global warming is exacerbated rather than mitigated.  
  Unfortunately, this verdict transfers to the ad-valorem tax on the extraction volume if the 
transaction costs are negligible. When  ( ) 0 gS= , equation (16) equally applies to such a tax 
with  ˆˆ * θ θ = .  
  If extraction costs are assumed, the problem of moving the economy in the wrong direction 
is mitigated, and with sufficiently strong extraction costs, current extraction may even move 
in the right direction. In general, as has been shown by Long and Sinn (1985), with or without 
extraction costs, the borderline case where taxation is neutral for the extraction path is 
characterized by an absolute tax wedge that increases at the rate of discount, i.e. in the current 
model at the rate i π + , so that the discounted revenue loss per unit of the extracted resource is 
                                                 
23 As my paper was published in a German conference volume, it had no influence on the discussion of the same 
problem by Ulph and Ulph (1994) and Sinclair (1994). The German paper can be downloaded from the CESifo 
website: www.CESifo.de.   
24 For a closely related discussion of the intertemporal distortions resulting from a non-constant tax on ordinary 
consumption goods, see Howitt and Sinn (1989).    22
constant. As the absolute tax wedge with an ad-valorem tax is  *P τ , it follows that the 
borderline case is characterized by  
 
(17)      ˆ ˆ* Pi τ π += +        (borderline case for ad-valorem consumption tax neutrality).  
 
Faster increase of the tax wedge implies the resource firms anticipate extraction and a smaller 
increase implies they will postpone extraction. Using (7), condition (17) can easily be 
converted to 
 






τπ =+       (borderline case for ad-valorem consumption tax neutrality).  
 
This condition confirms that, without extraction costs ( () 0 gS= ), a constant ad-valorem tax 
would be neutral:  ˆ*0 τ = . With extraction costs, P  grows at a lower rate and thus tax 
neutrality is compatible with a rising ad-valorem tax rate. If the tax rate rises faster than in the 
borderline case, the extraction path will again become steeper, with more current extraction 
and faster global warming. As this case remains a plausible possibility if the unit extraction 
costs are small relative to price, I conclude that the risk that ad-valorem taxes on the emission 
of carbon dioxide are useless or even dangerous is far too large to justify their 
implementation.  
  To demonstrate the argument in R,S space use again the simplified model introduced in the 
previous section. To keep the formal expressions simple, return to the cash flow tax, but keep 
in mind that a cash flow tax with  ˆ 0 θ <  produces qualitatively the same result as an ad-
valorem consumption tax with  ˆ*( ) ( ) / ( ) ig S P R τ π >+ : It follows from (10) and (16) that, 
instead of (11), we now have 
 
(19)      









             (changing cash flow tax) . 
 




















            Figure 2: The green policy paradox 
  
  Figure (2) illustrates these results. The three lower paths are those shown in figure 1. The 
second path from below characterizes the market equilibrium with well-defined property 
rights and no government intervention  ˆ (0 ) πθ = = . The lowest path shows the Pareto 
optimum with the greenhouse effect. The second path from above characterizes the behavior 
of markets if property rights are insecure  ˆ (0 , 0 ) πθ >= . Above this path is the path resulting 
from an increasing cash flow tax rate or an ad-valorem tax on the flow of extraction whose 
increase satisfies the condition  ˆ*( ) ( ) / ( ) ig S P R τ π >+ . It characterizes a green policy 
paradox insofar as the anticipation of a gradual greening of policy in the sense of an 
increasing cash flow or sufficiently increasing consumption tax rate will make the flow of 
current extraction even higher, and speed up global warming even more, than would be the 
case without government intervention.  
  Unfortunately, this result not only applies to an increasing tax rate but to the bulk of the 
green demand reducing policies discussed in section 2.  
•  Think of better insulation of homes, of lighter cars and of traffic reductions as 
examples of measures that directly reduce the demand for fossil fuels. 
•  Think of the generation of electricity from wind, water, sunlight, biomass or vehicle 








(π = 0)  24
fossil fuels by providing non-fossil energy alternatives.  
•  Think of nuclear energy, nuclear fusion in particular, which, albeit not particularly 
green, also belong into this category. The electricity generated from nuclear energy 
could be used to produce hydrogen, which would facilitate storing and transportation 
of the energy provided.  
•  Think of pellet heating, bio diesel, heat pumps or solar heating as further examples of 
measures that reduce the demand for fossil fuels because the energy comes from other 
sources.  
•  Think of modern diesel engines and optimized power plants as examples of devices 
that reduce the demand for fossil fuels because they increase the technical efficiency 
of combustion processes.  
 
  All of these measures are currently intensely debated in the industrialized countries, and 
governments pour out subsidies to develop them further. As the world becomes warmer and 
more and more people accept and understand the mechanics of the greenhouse effect, public 
support for such measures will rise so that the demand reducing effect becomes stronger and 
stronger. This will have similar implications for the development of the prices resource 
owners will be able to charge as a general ad-valorem tax on carbon consumption that 
increases with the passage of time. Indeed it is straightforward to re-interpret the tax wedge 
*P τ  assumed above as a demand wedge that pushes the demand curve prevailing at a 
particular point in time proportionately downward relative to the position that would have 
prevailed without the government policies that aim at reducing the production of carbon 
dioxide.  *P θ  in this case is the observable  (consumer and producer) market price, and P is 
the price that would have prevailed without the demand reducing measures had the extraction 
flow been the same. It follows that the anticipation of a gradual greening of public policies 
that satisfies the condition  ˆ*( ) ( ) / ( ) ig S P R τ π >+  will give resource owners the incentive to 
anticipate the price dampening effect by selling more in the present and less in the future. The 
extraction path is shifted upward as is demonstrated in figure 2 by the move from the second 
highest to the highest curve, which, unfortunately, goes in the wrong direction exacerbating 
the double distortion that already results from insecure property rights and the greenhouse 
effect. The demand reducing measures of those countries for which the Kyoto Protocol 
involves binding constraints are not only useless, as was argued in section 2 under the 
hypothetical assumption of a constant supply path. What is more, they may even worsen the 
situation, because they induce the resource extracting countries to speed up their extraction.   25
The current price of carbon falls under these measures sufficiently to induce the unconstrained 
countries to buy so much more that the reduction in consumption of the constrained countries 
is overcompensated.  
 
6. Useful policies against global warming 
While ad-valorem carbon taxes and other demand reducing measures of the type emphasized 
by politicians and in the public debate may be useless or even dangerous, because they may 
cause countervailing supply reactions, the set of effective policies against global warming is 
not empty. This section discusses the remaining possibilities. Basically they consist of  
- public finance measures to flatten the supply path 
- safer property rights 
- binding quantity constraints and  
- technical means to decouple the accumulation of carbon dioxide from carbon consumption.  
Let us look into these options.  
 
 
6.1 Public finance measures to flatten the supply path  
 
6.1.1 Decreasing ad-valorem tax rate 
If an increasing ad-valorem tax rate tilts the supply path in the wrong direction, a declining 
one might do the job. Suppose therefore, the government started today with a high tax rate 
and announced that this tax rate would decline with the passage of time. In principle, such a 
policy would give the resource extractors the incentive to postpone extraction.
25     
  This possibility can be understood by inspection of equation (16), which refers to a cash 
flow tax or, equivalently, to an ad-valorem tax when extraction costs are negligible. 
Obviously, when the tax rate declines such that  ˆ θ π =  it is possible to compensate for the risk 
of expropriation. And when it declines faster such that  ˆ θ π >  it is even possible to mitigate 
the distortion from the greenhouse effect, tilting the extraction path in the direction of the 
lowest path in figures 1 and 2, which satisfies the Pareto conditions (9) and (12).  
  Although the policy of reducing the ad-valorem tax rate is a theoretical possibility, it 
would not be very practicable. One problem is that it would lead to a negative tax rate in finite 
                                                 
25 A detailed formal analysis can be found in Sinn (1982) and  Long and Sinn (1985). See also  Sinclair (1994) 
and Ulph and Ulph (1994) who independently found the same result. There is a box on this issue in the Stern 
Review (Stern et al. 2006, p. 318) which alludes to the latter three authors. However, the box remains isolated in 
the Stern report and has no visible influence on the course of the analysis.    26
time so that the government would have to effectively subsidize resource consumption.
26  
Another problem is that the government may not be able to credibly commit to gradually 
cutting taxes on carbon consumption. Rising environmental concern of the public will make a 
policy of gradually reducing the tax rate hard to implement, regardless of what was initially 
announced.   
 
6.1.2 A unit tax on carbon consumption 
A better possibility to achieve a similar result is the introduction of a constant unit tax on 
carbon extraction, which perhaps could be more credibly defended. As I showed in Sinn 
(1982) and as follows from the more general theorem of Long and Sinn (1985), a unit tax 
would slow down extraction. The absolute tax wedge it implies is a constant and thus the unit 
tax satisfies the Long–Sinn theorem according to which extraction is slowed down if the 
discounted tax wedge declines with the passage of time. Admittedly, in theory, a unit tax 
could also be perverted into a global warming device by increasing its rate sufficiently fast. 
However, in comparison to an ad-valorem tax on resource consumption, a unit tax is much 
more “distant” from the borderline condition to which the theorem of Long and Sinn refers. 
So the danger that a further greening of tax policy would tilt the extraction path in the wrong 
direction is much smaller.  
  A unit tax on carbon consumption would, in principle, do the job the Stern Review 
expected from carbon taxation. Note, however, that it would not slow down global warming 
because it internalizes a marginal externality of similar size but because its present value 
declines with the passage of time. There is no similarity between the static argument used in 
the Stern Review and the dynamic forces set in motion by the tax.    
  Of course, even the unit tax on carbon extraction needs to be uniform world wide, because, 
if not, the non-taxing countries could free ride on the price dampening effect the tax creates, 
consuming more than they otherwise would have done in the present and in the future.  
 
6.1.3 Subsidizing the stock in situ 
A more direct way to internalize the negative externality exerted by the accumulated stock of 
carbon dioxide or, equivalently, the positive externality generated by the stock of carbon in 
situ,  S f , would be to subsidize the stock in situ. If, say, the consuming countries decided to 
pay each year a fee of size  S f S  to the resource owners to keep their proven stocks 
                                                 
26 The problem could be avoided by imposing a lower bound for the tax rate. Starting with a sufficiently high  
tax rate one could approach the optimal path as close as one wishes. A proof can be found in Sinn (1982, esp. pp. 
95–98).    27
underground, the externality would effectively be internalized and, provided there are no 
other distortions, market forces would satisfy the normative equation (9) for a Pareto optimal 
extraction path in the presence of global warming.   
  As much as this is a theoretical possibility, from a political perspective it would be an 
impossible proposal. No one will succeed in convincing those countries that already suffer 
from high oil prices to bribe the oil sheiks to cut their oil supply and charge even higher prices 
than they do anyway.  
 
6.1.4 Taxing capital income   
As the problem of overextraction implies a wrongly composed portfolio of man-made and 
natural capital, the portfolio composition can be improved by taxing the returns to man-made 
capital, while leaving the capital gains of the resource owners untaxed, and indeed, to a first 
order of approximation, this is the situation prevailing in the world.    
  How the taxation of interest income affects the equilibrium path follows from an extension 
of (7). Abstract from insecure property rights such that  0 π = . When interest income is taxed 
at the rate τ% , the market equilibrium is given by  
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A comparison with (9) shows that, with any given i, this condition implies the same 
development of the price path as would be Pareto optimal if  
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%            (Pareto efficient capital income tax rate). 
 
  While this seems an attractive solution at first glance, a qualification is appropriate insofar 
as interest income taxation drives down the speed of capital accumulation so that, eventually, 
the tax may simply increase the gross interest rate, leaving the net-of-tax interest rate 
constant. Thus the speed of global warming may not be affected much while too little man-
made capital is handed over to future generations if judged by intertemporal utility 
comparisons such as those in equations (5) and (6). For these reasons, global warming cannot 
really be used to legitimate capital income taxation.  
  However, given that there is capital income taxation and given that only a fraction of the   28
world’s financial saving comes from the resource owners, two conclusions seem plausible. 
First, governments should not, for symmetry reasons, tax the income from resource ownership 
in the same way they tax capital income. Second, they should make every attempt to tax the 
capital income earned by resource owners in the international markets in a similar way they 
tax capital income by other people. Thus the international community of countries could try to 
close the tax havens existing in the world and make sure that all interest income is subjected 
to a minimum source tax. This would make it a little less attractive for the sheiks to convert 
their in situ resources into Swiss bank accounts.  
 
6.2 Safer property rights 
A more straightforward method to make Swiss bank accounts less attractive is securing the 
property rights of the resource owners. If the transitional expropriation probability π  is set 
equal to zero, one of the main reasons for overextraction would be eliminated. As shown by 
(7), the extraction path would become flatter, such that the speed of global warming declines. 
While this in itself would not be enough to reach the Pareto optimum as described by (9), it 
might be a big move in the right direction.  
  Again, unfortunately, the theoretical solution is more straightforward than its practical 
implementation. The Iraq war tells a painful lesson in this regard. Despite all the resources the 
war has consumed it seems, if anything, that it has made the property rights for the resource 
owners of that country more unstable. In view of the perils of global warming it might have 
been better to support and stabilize the regime of Saddam Hussein and all the other resource 
owning dictators of the world rather than threatening them with democracy, but of course 
there were other considerations involved. 
 
6.3 Quantity constraints and emissions trading 
The difficulty with the public finance solution to the problem of global warming suggested by 
the Stern Review is that it is of a static nature while the problem is intrinsically dynamic. It is 
impossible to find the appropriate level of the carbon tax that Stern et al. are seeking because 
it is the change of that tax rather than the level that matters.  
  The difficulty can be avoided by not speculating about the economy’s quantity reactions to 
price signals but by controlling the quantities themselves, the alternative to carbon taxation 
that the Stern report suggests. This can best be done with systems of emissions license trading 
such as those existing in the US and Europe, and it is the approach of the Kyoto Protocol. In 
principle it will work, because the aggregate extraction path itself is controlled by political   29
decisions, while the market only has the task of allocating the necessary restraint in carbon 
consumption efficiently among firms and countries.  
  With quantity constraints on  2 CO  production, the governments of the consumption 
countries effectively create a world-wide monopsony for carbon that cuts demand and 
depresses the producer price of carbon at the same time. As this creates a monopsony profit at 
the expense of the resource extracting countries and mitigates the problem of global warming 
in addition, there is every reason to participate.  
  But of course, there are downsides to this solution. One is X-inefficiency. Giving the 
intertemporal allocation task to governments does not automatically ensure that the Pareto 
efficient extraction path will be pursued. As governments lack the knowledge necessary to 
define the optimal time path of carbon emissions, the best society can hope for is a rough 
approximation to the optimum. Still, the perils of global warming are potentially so large and 
the market failure is so obvious that vigorous action is urgently needed.  
  Another is the completeness of the trading system. If it does not incorporate all important 
countries of the world, it may be useless or even counterproductive in the same sense as other 
demand reducing measures are that gain strength with the passage of time. The trading system 
reduces the demand of the participating countries and hence depresses the world market price 
at which the non-participating countries can buy the carbon. If the quantity constraints are 
gradually tightened such that, given the old supply path, the discounted market price of 
carbon would decline with the passage of time, the theorem of Long and Sinn (1985) applies 
according to which resource extractors would react by making the supply path steeper, thus 
exacerbating the problem of global warming. Because of the increase in current supply, the 
current world market price would decline so much that the extra demand of the non-
participating countries would overcompensate the demand restraint of the participating 
countries. 
  The Kyoto Protocol constrains only a minority of countries. The countries that ratified the 
Protocol and face binding constraints consume just 29%
27 of annual carbon supply. India and 
China signed, but are not constrained, and many countries including the USA and Australia 
did not sign. Unless these countries participate, nothing is gained. The efforts of the EU, 
which has promised in the Kyoto Protocol to reduce its production of carbon dioxide 
                                                 
27 CO2 emission data for 2004 from IEA World Energy Survey (2006). The countries constrained by the Kyoto 
Protocol include the EU–27 (which contributed 15% of world CO2 emissions), Canada (2%), Iceland (0.008%), 
Japan (4.6%), New Zealand (0.12%), Norway (0.14%), Russia (5.7%) and the Ukraine (1.1%). The USA 
contributed 21.8%, China 17.8%, Australia 1.3% and India 4.1% of world CO2 emissions in 2004.     30
(including carbon equivalents of other greenhouse gases) from 1990 to 2008–2012 by 8%,
28 
simply subsidize an even faster resource intensive growth process in China and make 
Americans drive even more SUVs and mega-trucks than they would have done anyway. 
  Nevertheless, Kyoto is a good start because it did show that world wide cooperative 
agreements are possible. Integrating, the four big countries mentioned would mean that 
another 45% of carbon consumption, in total three quarters of world consumption, would be 
captured. This share in itself would be substantial, and the hope that the remaining quarter 
could also be disciplined by political means would be justified.  
  
6.4 Sequestration and afforestation 
As was mentioned in section 2, sequestration and afforestation are exceptions to the rule that 
carbon extraction is proportional to the accumulation of  2 CO  in the atmosphere. Thus they 
offer a unique opportunity to cut the problematic link between the carbon extracted and the 
carbon dioxide accumulated in the atmosphere on which this paper has focused.  
  Consider sequestration first. If the  2 CO originating from combustion were pumped back 
into the Earth’s soil and stored underground, it could not pollute the air and hence could not 
contribute to global warming.  
  While this option sounds promising at first glance, closer scrutiny shows the practical 
limitations of sequestration.  
•  A substantial fraction of the carbon extracted comes from strip mining and does not 
leave any suitable storage space in the ground.  
•  The volume of  2 CO  that would have to be stored is truly gigantic, much greater than 
the volume of fossil fuel burned. One cubic meter of anthracite (1.35 tons) generates 
about 4 tons of  2 CO , which in liquid form (55 bar, 20°C) has a volume of 5.4 m
3. 
Similarly, one cubic meter of crude oil generates 3.6 m
3. of carbon dioxide, and one 
cubic meter of liquid methane generates 1.6 m
3. of carbon dioxide.
29  
•  Storage is not risk-free because  2 CO is a heavy gas that would stay close to the 
surface and crowd out oxygen once released.  
•  Storage absorbs a substantial part of the energy produced.
30  
 
                                                 
28 Press release of the European Union as of March 4
th 2002, MEMO/02/46. 
29 For those calculations I use a specific weight for liquid carbon dioxide of 0.74 t/m
3, a specific weight for coal 
of 1.35 t/m
3, a specific weight for oil of 0.85 t/m
3 and for liquid natural gas of 0.48 t/m
3. 
30 To produce a given amount of electricity currently a power station needs about 30% more coal if the carbon 
dioxide is to be stored underground. See  Kleinknecht (2007).    31
  Taking these difficulties into account it must be feared that sequestration will not make but 
a dent in the global warming process.  Nevertheless, it is worth trying, and there is every 
reason for governments to use the funds currently misspent as subsidies for windmills, 
photovoltaic energy, bio diesel and the like for sequestration.  
  The second exception is afforestation. Because trees grow tall, they are able to store 
substantial amounts of biomass on the ground, more than other plants. As biomass is largely 
reduced carbon, generated by photosynthesis from water and  2 CO , trees purify the 
atmosphere from the most important greenhouse gas.  
  Unfortunately, currently the world is far from the point were afforestation could reduce the 
greenhouse gases, as, on the contrary, the stock of forests is declining rapidly. It is estimated 
that net-deforestation each year destroys an area one and a half times the size of Ireland and 
oxidizes an amount of carbon greater than the combustion of fossil fuels by all traffic in the 
world, generating about 18% of total greenhouse gas emissions.
31  
  This nonsense can certainly be avoided. Led by the UN, the countries of this world should 
try to reach agreements to protect their forests and stop the deforestation process immediately. 
Moreover the rich countries should be able to bribe the developing and emerging countries 
where most of the forests are located into active afforestation programs.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
The Stern Review has triggered off a major debate on the problem of global warming, similar 
to the debate the Meadows report once induced with regard to the limited availability of 
natural resources. Surprisingly, however, there have been few attempts to reconcile these two 
debates. Neither in the public discourse nor in the Stern Review do exhaustible resources play 
any major role. The Stern Review mentions the issue, but only in passing, without ever trying 
to merge the two themes. In fact, however, the economics of climate change and the 
economics of exhaustible resources could not be more closely intertwined, for in essence the 
problem of global warming is the problem of gradually transporting the available stock of 
carbon from underground into the atmosphere, with useful oxidization on the way.  
  Markets unfortunately are unable to find the optimal path for this double stock-adjustment 
problem. Insecure property rights of resource owners and the externality of global warming 
distort the private incentives, leading both to overextraction relative to the criterion of 
intertemporal Pareto optimality.  
  Politicians seek to solve the problem by a myriad of measures aimed at reducing 
                                                 
31 See Houghton (2004, p. 250 n.) and Stern et al. (2006, p. xxv).-    32
2 CO emissions, which are, in fact, measures to reduce carbon demand, ranging from taxes on 
fossil fuel consumption to the development of alternative energy sources. However, these 
measures will not mitigate the problem of global warming, as they are unlikely to flatten the 
carbon supply path that wealth maximizing resource owners choose. If the measures reduce 
the price path of carbon that would result from a given extraction path such that the 
discounted value of the price reduction is constant for all points in time, resource owners will 
not react, and the extraction path will indeed remain unchanged. The current world price of 
carbon must fall sufficiently in this case to induce so much more carbon consumption by other 
consumers of carbon that the net effect on global warming is nil. If the measures reduce the 
discounted value of the carbon price in the future more than in the present, the problem of 
global warming will even be exacerbated, because resource owners will have an incentive to 
anticipate the price cuts by extracting the carbon earlier.  
  Useful policy measures that mitigate the problem of global warming must succeed in 
flattening the carbon supply path in the world energy markets. Among the public finance 
measures, unit taxes on carbon extraction and source taxes on capital income are feasible 
policy options that satisfy this requirement. A complete world-wide system of emissions 
trading that effectively combines the consuming countries to a monopsony would be able to 
enforce a more conservative carbon consumption path while in addition providing these 
countries with monopsony rents. Where possible, a stabilization of property rights in the 
resource extracting countries could also be tried to strengthen the conservation motive. 
Particular emphasis could be given to measures that try to decouple carbon extraction from 
the accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere. Sequestration is useful but difficult due to the 
gigantic quantities involved. Measures to stop the rapid deforestation of the world are 
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This appendix proves that under the assumptions made the extraction paths in the positive and 
normative variants of the model converge to the origin of the R,S diagram used in figure 1 and 
2. For brevity, only the basic variants without the taxes are considered here. The extension to 
the taxes considered is straightforward. 
 
Positive model 
Using the simplified specification of the model of section 4, the resource owner’s problem can 







max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) e d iu
R
P uRu gSu Ru u π ∞ −+ − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ∫ .  
   s .   t .   SR =− & ,  
      0 (0) SS =  . 
Here it is assumed that the representative resource owner behaves competitively, taking the 
price path as given although, in the aggregate,  () P PR =  with the assumed properties.  
 
The Hamiltonian for this problem is  
 
(A2)   () H PR g S R R λ =− − . 
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The necessary conditions for an optimum are the stationary optimality condition 
 
(A3)   ( ) Pg S λ −=   , 
 
the canonical equation  
  
(A4)  
'( ) ˆ gS R
i λ π
λ
−= +  
 
and the transversality condition 
 
(A5)   () lim ( ) ( ) e 0 it
t




  As shown in the text, the slope of the possible paths in R,S space is given by equation (11) 
which has been derived from condition (7). Note that this condition can also be derived from 
(A3) and (A4) if (A3) is differentiated with respect to time. Consider first paths satisfying the 
slope condition that enter the ordinate above the origin. These paths are not feasible as the 
stock of the resource becomes zero in finite time so that the necessary marginal conditions can 
no longer be satisfied. Next consider the feasible paths (satisfying the slope condition) 
entering the abscissa. Because of the assumed constancy of the price elasticity of demand and 
the boundedness of  () g S , equation (3) implies that λ →∞ as  0 R → . Assuming that  () g S  is 
differentiable, the second term in equation (A4) vanishes as  0 R →   and hence  ˆ λ  converges 
to i π +  as t  goes to infinity. This means that  () ()e it t π λ −+ does not converge to zero as time 




The crucial marginal condition for the normative variant of the model has been derived 
directly from the postulate of Pareto optimality in Sinn (2007). In addition to that marginal 
condition, a transversality condition has to hold that can be derived from the social planner’s 
goal  
 




max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) e d iu
R
R uS u g S u R u u φψ
∞ − +− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ∫ .  
   s .   t .   SR =− & ,  
      0 (0) SS = . 
 
The Hamiltonian for this problem is  
 
(A7)   () () () H RS g S R R φ ψλ =+− −  . 
 
The necessary conditions for an optimum are the stationary optimality condition 
 
(A8)   '( ) ( ) Rg S φ λ −=   , 
 
the canonical equation  
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(A9)  








and the transversality condition 
 
(A10)   lim ( ) ( ) e 0 it
t





  The slopes of possible paths in R,S space are given by condition (9). Note that 
differentiating (A8) with respect to time and inserting the result into (A9) also gives this 
condition.  
  Paths that reach the ordinate above the origin once again are not feasible since they end in 
finite time and make it impossible to satisfy the marginal conditions thereafter. Moreover, it 
follows from (A8) that λ goes to infinity as R approaches zero. Differentiability of  ( ) g S  and 
the assumption that  '( ) S ψ  is bounded from above imply that  ˆ λ  approaches i as time goes to 
infinity which in turn implies that the transversality condition (A10) can only be met as S goes 
to zero as time goes to infinity, q.e.d.  
 
  Thus it has been shown that, despite global warming and stock dependent extraction costs, 
the assumptions about the limiting properties of extraction and production functions made in 
the text imply that no part of the stock in situ will and should be permanently excluded from 
extraction.  
 